Abstract-This paper presents a new framework of identifying a series of cyber data attacks on power system synchrophasor measurements. We focus on detecting "unobservable" cyber data attacks that cannot be detected by any existing method that purely relies on measurements received at one time instant. Leveraging the approximate low-rank property of phasor measurement unit (PMU) data, we formulate the identification problem of successive unobservable cyber attacks as a matrix decomposition problem of a low-rank matrix plus a transformed columnsparse matrix. We propose a convex-optimization-based method and provide its theoretical guarantee in the data identification. Numerical experiments on actual PMU data from the Central New York power system and synthetic data are conducted to verify the effectiveness of the proposed method.
I. INTRODUCTION
T HE integration of cyber infrastructures into future smart grids greatly enhances the monitoring, dispatch, and scheduling of power systems. Such integration, however, makes the power systems more susceptible to cyber attacks. It is reported that cyber spies have penetrated U.S. electrical grid [26] . Researchers have also launched an experimental cyber attack that caused a generator to self-destruct [15] .
State estimation [1] is a critical component of power system monitoring. System state is estimated based on the obtained measurements across the system. Bad data can affect the state estimation and mislead the system operator. Many efforts have been devoted to develop methods that can identify bad data, see e.g., [6] , [14] , [25] , [27] , [35] .
Cyber data attacks (firstly studied in [23] ) can be viewed as "the worst interacting bad data injected by an adversary" [18] . Malicious intruders with system configuration information can simultaneously manipulate multiple measurements so that these attacks cannot be detected by any bad data detector. Because the removal of affected measurements would make the system unobservable, these attacks are termed as "unobservable attacks" 1 in [18] . State estimation in the presence of cyber data attacks has attracted much research attention recently [3] , [9] , [18] , [22] , [23] , [29] - [31] . Existing approaches include protecting a small number of key measurement units such that the intruders cannot inject unobservable attacks without hacking protected units [3] , [9] , [17] , as well as detectors designed for attacks in the observable regime [18] . The research on the detection of unobservable attacks is still limited. Refs. [22] , [30] proposed different methods to detect unobservable attacks in Supervisory Control and Data Acquisition (SCADA) system. The method in [30] relies critically on the assumption that the measurements at different time instants are i.i.d. samples of random variables. This assumption might not hold when the system is under disturbance. Ref. [22] focused on the scenarios that an intruder attacks a different set of measurements at each time instant, and no theoretical analysis of the detection performance is provided in [22] . This paper considers cyber data attacks to PMU measurements. It focuses on the case when an intruder injects unobservable data attacks to the same set of PMUs constantly. Because PMUs under attack do not provide any accurate measurement at any time instant to the operator, the attack identification in this case is very challenging and has not been addressed before. We propose a method that can identify the successive unobservable cyber data attacks and provide the theoretical guarantee even when the system is under disturbance. The intuition is that even though an intruder can constantly inject data attacks that are consistent with each other at each time instant, as long as the intruder does not know the system dynamics, one can identify the attacks by comparing time series of different PMUs and locating the PMUs that exhibit abnormal dynamics.
Because PMU measurements are synchronized and correlated, the high-dimensional PMU data matrix exhibits lowrank property [7] , [8] , [12] , [33] . We formulate the identification problem as a matrix decomposition problem of a lowrank matrix plus a transformed column-sparse matrix. The matrix decomposition problem has attracted much research attention recently, see e.g., [4] , [5] , [28] , [34] , and have wide applications in areas like Internet monitoring [19] , [24] , [32] , medical imaging [10] , [11] , and image processing [2] . The situation that one component is a transformed column-sparse matrix, however, has not been addressed before.
The contributions of this paper are threefold. (1) We propose the idea of exploiting spatial-temporal correlations in PMU measurements to identify unobservable data attacks. (2) We formulate the identification problem into a matrix decomposition problem and propose a computationally efficient method that does not require the modeling of power system dynamics. (3) We provide theoretical guarantees of attack detection, as well as the general matrix decomposition problem.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. We formulate our problem and point out its connection to other applications in Section II. We describe our detection method and analyze its theoretical guarantee with both noiseless (Section III) and noisy measurements (Section IV). Section V records our numerical experiments. We conclude the paper in Section VI.
II. PROBLEM FORMULATION AND RELATED WORK

A. Low-rankness of PMU measurements
Consider a n-bus power grid with PMUs installed on some buses. Let p denote the total number of PMU channels that measure bus voltage and line current phasors 2 . Phasors are expressed in Cartesian coordinates throughout the paper. Matrix M ∈ C t×p contains the collected phasor measurements in t synchronized time instants.J ∈ [[p]] denotes the set of PMU channels that are under data attacks. The observed measurement matrix can be presented as
whereL ∈ C t×p represents the actual phasors without data attacks,D ∈ C t×p represents the additive errors introduced by an intruder, and N represents the measurement noise.
High-dimensional PMU data matrices exhibit low-rank property [7] , [8] , [12] , [33] . We analyzed actual PMU data from six multi-channel PMUs deployed in the Central New York (NY) Power System (Fig. 1) . Six PMUs measure twentythree voltage and current phasors, and the data rate is thirty samples per second per channel. Fig. 2 shows the current magnitudes of PMU data in twenty seconds. An event occurs around 2.5s. The obtained data are collected into a 600 × 23 matrix. Fig. 3 plots the singular values of the matrix with the ten largest ones being 832. 8, 194.8, 35 .1, 18.1, 4.3, 2.5, 2.1, 1.3, 1.2, 0.5. Therefore, we can approximate the 600 × 23 matrix by a low-rank matrix with little approximation error.
The Singular Value Decomposition (SVD) ofL is
whereŪ ∈ C t×r ,Σ ∈ C r×r ,V ∈ C p×r (r ≪ t, p). We assume throughout the paper that nonzero columns ofD do not lie in the column space ofL (D =ŪŪ †D ). It is a legitimate assumption when the intruders do not have full information about the system dynamics. The notations are summarized in Table I . Matrix A is column-sparse if it contains a small fraction of non-zero columns. We call the set of indices of nonzero columns the column support of A. 
B. Unobservable cyber data attacks and problem formulation
We use bus voltage phasors as state variables, and let X ∈ C t×n contain the state variables at t instants. We use the π equivalent model to represent a transmission line (Fig. 4) . Z ij and Y ij denote the impedance and admittance of the transmission line between bus i and bus j. Current I ij from bus i to bus j is related to bus voltage V i and V j by
We defineW ∈ C p×n as follows. If the kth PMU channel measures the voltage phasor of bus j,W kj = 1; if it measures the current phasor from bus i to bus j, then
The PMU measurements and the state variables are related bȳ
The attack at time t, denoted by data injectionD t,: , is called unobservable 3 if and only if
holds for some nonzero row vector c t ∈ C 1×n . In this case,
and the operator would have the wrong impression that the state is X t,: + c t . We focus on the cases that the attacks from time 1 to t are all unobservable 4 , then we havē the largest ℓ 2 norm of the columns.
:= AV V † , the projection of A onto the row space.
if and only if P T (A) = A. I c the complimentary set of set I.
where W j =W j / W j .C represents the additive error (up to a scaling factor) to bus voltages due to data attacks, i.e., W j C j is the error to bus voltage V j . LetĪ ∈ [[n]] denote the column support ofC. We assumeC is column-sparse because intruders might only alter some of the state variables due to resource constraints. With increasing installation of PMUs, we anticipate that the total number of PMU channels p will be larger than the number of buses n. The transform in (7) reduces the degree of freedom inD. Combining (1) and (7), the obtained measurements under attack can be written as
The attack identification problem is formulated as follows. Given M and W , is it possible to separateL andC? We assume noise level is bounded and given, i.e., N F ≤ η. We say a method can identify an unobservable attack if it successfully determines the set of PMU channels that are under attack and recovers measurements that are not attacked.
Although cannot be detected at a given time instant, the unobservable attacks can be detected if the time series in the affected PMU channels exhibit dynamics different from those of unaffected PMUs. Mathematically, the matrix decomposition is possible if columns inD do not belong to the column space ofL.
We use a three-bus network (Fig. 5 ) to illustrate the notations. Let V i and I ij (i, j ∈ {1, 2, 3}) in C t×1 denote the bus voltages and line currents in t instants. Then 
Suppose the intruder manipulates measurements in all channels of PMU 1 and the channel of PMU 2 that measures I
21
and I 23 so that the system operator would have the wrong impression that the system states are
. In this case, the observed measurements under attacks when there is no noise are
The additive errors due to attacks arē
C. Connections to existing work
The detection of unobservable cyber data attacks has not been much addressed. [30] and [22] considered the detection of unobservable attacks to SCADA data and provided numerical results. [30] assumes the measurements across time are i.i.d. distributed and detects the attacks based on statistical learning. [22] assumes the SCADA measurements under DC power flow model are low-rank and proposes to detect the attacks by decomposing a low-rank matrix and a sparse matrix from their sum. Our work differs from [22] in that we assume the intruder constantly injects data attacks to the same set of PMUs, while [22] assumes the intruder attacks different PMUs at different time instants. Furthermore, we provide the theoretical guarantee of our detection method.
Our problem formulation of matrix decomposition is closely related to those in [34] and [24] . When W is an identity matrix, our problem reduces to the one in [34] . The difference Method 1 Unobservable cyber attack identification method Input: PMU measurements M in t instants; coefficient η; the set Ω of the locations (i, j) of the observed entries. Find (L * , C * ), the optimum solution to the following optimization problem
Compute the SVD of
between our model and the one in [24] is that the sparse matrix C in [24] has nonzero entries located independent of each other, whileC here is a column-sparse matrix. Our method and analysis are built up those in [34] , but we consider a more general framework of matrix decomposition through the introduction of the transform matrix W . The significance of our work is twofold. First, we for the first time consider the case that the additive error matrixD can be dense (i.e., W is a dense matrix), while the error matrices in [34] and [24] are sparse. We show through both theoretical analysis and numerical experiments that it is possible to achieve matrix decomposition with denseD. Second, when D is a column-sparse matrix itself (i.e., W is sparse), our decomposition method outperforms those in [34] and [24] (see Section V-B and V-C) in the sense that our recovery method can tolerate a higher level of corruption (i.e., large support size ofD). This advance results from exploiting (7), which reduces the degree of freedom ofD.
Note that our method and analysis hold for an arbitrary W and can be applied to other domains that involve decomposing a matrix as in (8) . As discussed in [24] , applications include unveiling network traffic anomalies [19] , [32] , dynamic magnetic resonance imaging [10] , [11] , face recognition [2] , and music analysis [20] , [21] .
III. ATTACK IDENTIFICATION WITHOUT NOISE
A. Identification method and guarantee
We first consider noiseless measurements (η = 0). We assume a complete set of measurements for analysis, but our method can be extended to cases when measurements are partially lost. Moreover, although we consider attack patterns in (7), our method can be generalized to detect combined attacks. In this case,D is generalized tō
where a sparse matrixS represents attacks (observable and/or unobservable) that have different locations across time. Then (12)-(13) are generalized to
with given positive constants λ 1 , λ 2 . We study this extension numerically in Section V-B.
To formally present the theoretical result, we need the following definitions. GivenL =ŪΣV † and W , we define
and σ k := max
Note that σ 1 = 1 as W has unit-norm columns, and ǫ depends on the rank r ofL, since V 2 F = r. Pick any constantsψ and c in (0, 1) such that
For any integer k, define
and
Our detection method is summarized in Method 1. (13) is a convex program and can be solved efficiently by generic solvers such as CVX [13] . Its recovery guarantee is as follows.
Theorem 1. Suppose there exists nonzerok such that
kµ ≤ c, and
with c, λ min,k , and λ max,k defined in (19) - (21) . Then as long as the column support ofC has size at mostk, for any λ ∈ [λ min,k , λ max,k ], the output of Method 1 satisfies
J * =J and L * J * c =LJ c . Theorem 1 guarantees that the affected PMUs can be correctly located and thus, the "clean" PMU measurements could be identified. Furthermore, the subspace spanned by the actual phasors can be recovered. Since we do not obtain any actual measurements from PMUs that are under attack, it is impossible to recover the exact measurements in the affected PMUs without further regularization. Under the conditions of Theorem 1, the recovery is also successful when the column support ofC is zero. Thus, the false alarm rate is zero.
Method 1 is motivated by [34] . In fact, after post-
to both sides of (1), we have
where the right-hand side is the sum of a low-rank matrix plus a column-sparse matrix and noise. Then, the results of [34] can be directly applied to our problem. We do not follow this path due to two reasons.
cannot be computed if some entries of M are missing, while Method 1 can be easily extended to scenarios with missing data by restricting the constraints in (13) to the observed measurements. Second, (W T W ‡ ) −1 does not exist when W is a flat matrix, i.e., p < n, while Method 1 and Theorem 1 can be applied to an arbitrary W .
B. Discussion of λ andk
We remark that due to the slackness in the proof, λ ∈ [λ min,k , λ max,k ] in Theorem 1 is sufficient but not necessary 5 . There may exist λ outside [λ min,k , λ max,k ] that can still lead to correct recovery. We observe from numerical experiments that recovery performance is generally much better than the bound in Theorem 1. Furthermore, when L is fixed, ask decreases, λ min,k decreases, and λ max,k increases. Thus, intuitively, if the number of affected PMUs decreases, a wider range of λ is proper for Method 1. For a detailed discussion, we state the following lemma and defer its proof to the Appendix.
Since σ k increases in k, σ 1 ≥ 1, and kµ ≤ c < 1, together with Lemma 1, we know σk = Θ (1) 6 . Sinceψ is a constant, one can check that λ min,k = Θ(ǫ), and λ max,k = Θ( 1/k). Note that V † 2 F = r. We assume that V † is columnincoherent [34] with some positive constant ρ > 1, i.e.,
We assume the number of PMU channels incident to each bus is in the range of [d, Cd] for some d > 0 and some constant C. This is also the number of nonzero entries in each column of W with unit column-norm. Then p = Θ(dn), and we have
Therefore, as long ask = O(n/r), when n is sufficiently large,
hold, then a proper λ exists, and Theorem 1 holds.
In the case that d = Θ(n),k could be Θ(n/r). If r is a constant, our method succeeds even when a constant fraction of bus voltages are corrupted. Also consider the case thatk = 1. We pickψ and c in (19) arbitrarily close to one, then λ = 1 is a proper choice (see Fig. 16 for results on actual PMU data) provided that ǫ + µ ≤ 0.5. Since ǫ scales as 1/ √ n and µ scales as 1/d, the condition will be met in large systems that are tightly connected. Intuitively, µ is small if the bus degree is high, and the line impedances are in the same range.
We next use an example to illustrate the existence of proper λ. Consider an n-bus (n is even) ring network in Fig. 6 . Each odd-numbered bus is connected to all even-numbered buses. There is no connection among odd buses and no connection among even-numbered buses. A PMU is installed on each odd bus and measures the corresponding voltage phasor and all incident line current phasors. For the simplicity of analysis, we assume Z ij = 1 and Y ij = 0 in this ring network. W is a ( 
where the first inequality follows from (26) , and the second inequality follows from (24) . To find λ, we pick c = 1/4 andψ = 1/8. We choosẽ k = n 48ρr . One can check that (19) follows. Theñ
where the last inequality follows since ρ > 1 and r ≥ 1. Then from Lemma 1, we have
From (20) and (21),
Since 23 n ] suffices. Note that for a constant r,k is linear in n, the total number of buses.
C. Proof sketch of Theorem 1
The proof of Theorem 1 follows the same line as the proof of Theorem 1 in [34] . With the additional projection matrix W , our proof is more involved than the one in [34] .
Like [34] , we design the following Oracle Problem (32) by adding explicit constraints that the solution pair should have the correct column space ofL and the correct column support ofC. The major step is to show that an optimal solution (L * ,C * ) to (13) is also an solution to the Oracle problem (32) . Note that Oracle problem is only designed for analysis, sincē U andĪ are unknown to the operator.
be an optimal solution to the Oracle problem (32). We define
where I ′ is the column support of C ′ . We have
Lemma 2 (Lemma 4 and Lemma 5 of [34])
.
There exists an orthonormal matrixV ∈ C t×p such that
Also, we have
The following lemma establishes that the solution to the Oracle problem (32) is also a solution to (13) , (32) is an optimal solution to (13) if there exists Q ∈ C t×p that satisfies
If both (b) and (d) are strict, and PJ ∩ P
The major technical step is to construct Q, called the dual certificate, that satisfies (34) . Our construction method is as follows. PickĤ ∈ G(C ′ ) that satisfieŝ
Define
We show that Q in (39) is well defined in Appendix-B. Lemma 4 shows that Q in (39) is the desired dual certificate. (19) , and λ min,k ≤ λ max,k with λ min,k and λ max,k defined in (20) and (21) . Then as long as the column support of C has size at mostk, for any λ ∈ [λ min,k , λ max,k ], Q defined in (39) satisfies (34) .
Lemma 4. Suppose there exists nonzerok such thatkµ ≤ c for c in
Theorem 1 follows when we combine Lemmas 3 and 4. Please refer to the Appendix for the proofs.
IV. ATTACK IDENTIFICATION WITH NOISE
We now analyze the detection performance when M contains noise (N = 0) with N F ≤ η. Given k, define
Theorem 2. Suppose there exists nonzerok such thatkµ ≤ c
for c in (19) , and λ
. Then if column support size ofC is at mostk, for any
λ ∈ [λ ′ min,k , λ ′ max,k ], there exists a pair (L,C), whereL +CW T =L +CW T ,
PŪ (L) =L and PĪ (C) =C, such that the output of Method 1 satisfies
where θ := min(t, p).
The discussion of the existence of λ is very similar to the discussion for Theorem 1, so we skip it. Ifkµ ≤ c andk = O(n/r) hold, then a proper λ exists. Theorem 2 guarantees that (L * , C * ) returned by Method 1 is "close" to a pair that has the correct column space and column support, and the distance measured by Frobenius norm is proportional to the noise level η. The proof of Theorem 2 follows the same line as the proof of Theorem 2 in [34] mostly with modifications to address the projection matrix W . We establish Lemma 5, a counterpart in the noisy case of Lemma 3, that demonstrates that Method 1 succeeds if there exists a dual certificate Q with tighter requirements than that in the noiseless case.
Lemma 5. There exists (L,C) whereL+CW T =L+CW T , PŪ (L) =L, PĪ(C) =C, such that the output of Method 1 satisfies (40) and (41), if there exists Q ∈ C
t×p that satisfies
The construction of Q is the same as that in Section III (equations (35) 
V. SIMULATION
We explore the performance of data attack identification methods on both synthetic data and actual PMU data from the Central NY power system. We use CVX [13] to solve (13) . We identify a column of C * to be nonzero if its ℓ 2 norm exceeds the predefined threshold ǫ 1 . Method 1 succeeds if U * U * † −ŪŪ † ≤ ǫ 2 for some small positive ǫ 2 , and the column supports ofC and C * are the same.
A. Performance on synthetic data
Fix t = p = 50. Given rank r, we generate matrices A ∈ R t×r and B ∈ R p×r with each entry independently drawn from Gaussian N (0, 1) and setL := AB T . We generate matrix W ∈ R p×n with independent N (0, 1) entries. To generate a column-sparse matrixC ∈ R t×n , we randomly select the column support and set the nonzero entries to be independent N (0, 1). We vary r and the number of corrupted columns, and take 100 runs for each case. λ is set to be 0.95.
1) Noiseless formulation:
We simulate the observed measurement matrix M according to (8) with N = 0. We apply Method 1 to obtain the estimation (L * , C * ). We set ǫ 1 and ǫ 2 to be 0.002 and 0.01, respectively. Fig. 7 shows the transition property of Method 1 in gray scale. White stands for 100% success while black denotes 100% failure. When n is 25, W is a tall matrix (p > n). When n is 100, W is a flat matrix (p < n). For both simulations, the identification is successful even when rank r is six, andC has two nonzero columns. We further assume some of the observations are missing. We generate M as before and then delete some randomly selected entries. Fig. 8 shows the decomposition performance of Method 1 for partial observation. We can see that the successful decomposition rate is close to the complete observation case even only 80% of the entries are observed. 
2) Noisy formulation:
We generate matrix N ∈ R t×p with independent Gaussian N (0, σ 2 ) entries. We fix the matrix rank r to be 3 and the number of corrupted columns to be 3. We simulate the observed measurement matrix M according to (8) . We set η to be N F and apply Method 1 to obtain the estimation (L * , C * ). ǫ 1 is set to be 0.001. Fig. 9 shows the difference between the original and reconstructed column space ( U * U * † −ŪŪ † ) and the succeed rate for determining the set of corrupted columns according to different noise level σ. We can see that Method 1 can successfully identify the corrupted columns when the noise level σ is below 0.25. Method 1 can recover the column space with small errors when σ is smaller than 0.1.
B. Comparison with other methods on synthetic data 1)D =CW
T is column-sparse: Refs. [34] [22] considered matrix decomposition problem whenD is column-sparse and scattered-sparse, respectively. We compare our method with them in the special case thatD =CW T is column-sparse. Fix t = p = 50, n = 20, and r = 2. We generateL andC with the same rules as in Section V-A. We generate a binary matrix W ∈ R p×n with two '1's each row and five '1's each column. Then the ratio of support sizes ofD andC is about five.D is column-sparse whenC is column-sparse. We simulate the measurement matrix M according to (8) with N = 0. λ in our method is set to be 0.9. λ's in methods of [34] and [22] are set to be 0.5 and 0.1, respectively. Fig. 10 shows the success rates of three methods with different support sizes ofC. Our method performs the best since we exploit the structureD =CW T besides sparsity. The false alarm rate of our method is zero.
2) Combination of attack patterns.: We consider the general case that the attacks satisfy (14) . We use the generalized version in (15)- (16) to detect combined attacks. λ 1 and λ 2 in (15) are set to be 1 and 0.1, respectively. λ's in methods of Our method Method in [34] Method in [22] Number of corrupted columns inC Success rate Fig. 10 : Success rates whenD =CW T is column-sparse.
[34] and [22] are set to be 0.5 and 0.1, respectively.L,C, and W are generated the same as above.S is a sparse matrix with nonzero entries independently drawn from N (0, 1). We define the correct estimation of the column space ofL as a successful recovery. Fig. 11 compares the methods whenC is a zero matrix. The attacks are scattered-sparse, and our method performs as well as that in [22] . Fig. 12 compares the methods when both column-sparse and scattered-sparse attacks exist. Besides a sparseS, we randomly select two columns inC and select their entries independently from N (0, 1). Only our method succeeds when both attacks exist. Our method Method in [34] Method in [22] Percentage of corrupted entries inS Our method Method in [34] Method in [22] Percentage of corrupted entries inS whenC has two nonzero columns 
C. Performance comparison on actual PMU data
We consider the PMU data shown in Section II-A. Two twosecond PMU datasets are tested. One contains ambient data, and the other contains an abnormal event (t = 17 − 19s and t = 2 − 4s in Fig. 2, respectively) . We first inject data attacks as an intruder and then use Method 1 to detect the attacks.
We consider the scenario that an intruder alters the PMU channels that measure I 12 ,I 52 ,I 13 and I 43 in order to corrupt voltage estimations of Buses 2 and 3. Fig. 13 visualizes the actual PMU data and the data after the injection of attacks for two 2-second datasets. η and λ are set to be 5 and 1 respectively in Method 1. Fig. 14 shows the ℓ 2 norm of each column of the resultingD matrix. The columns with significant ℓ 2 norm correspond to channels that measure I 12 ,I 52 ,I
13 and I 43 . Therefore, our method successfully identifies the four PMU channels under attack. We repeat the same experiment when an intruder alters the channels that measure V 5 , I 52 , I
54 , I 59 , and I 45 to corrupt voltage estimation of Buses 5. Fig. 15 shows the ℓ 2 norm of each column of the resultinḡ C matrix in this case. The column with significant ℓ 2 norm corresponds Bus 5. Thus the recovery is also successful. [34] on the ambient PMU data. Given support size ofC, the result is averaged over all possible attack locations. Our method outperforms [34] because we exploit (7) to reduce the degree of freedom inD. For example, 7 out of 23 channels needs to be attacked to change the state of Bus 1. That means 30% of the columns ofD are nonzero. This high percentage of corruption inD cannot be handedly by [34] . 
VI. CONCLUSION
We address the problem of detecting successive unobservable cyber data attacks to PMU measurements. We formulate the identification problem as a matrix decomposition problem of a low-rank matrix and a transformed column-sparse matrix. We propose a convex-optimization-based method and provide its theoretical guarantee. Although motivated by power system monitoring, our results on matrix decomposition can be applied to other scenarios. One future direction is the analysis of the detection performance when some of the measurements are lost during the communication to the central operator.
the last inequality follows from kµ < 1. Then,
The lemma follows from the definition of σ k .
B. Proof of Lemma 3
Proof:
c and ∆ i = 0, and
′ is an optimal solution to (13) . If (34) holds with strict inequality, the last inequality of (43) is strict unless
(44) implies that ∆W T ∈ P T ′ and ∆ ∈ PĪ . Note that ∆ ∈ PĪ implies that ∆W T ∈ PJ . Then
where the last equality holds since PJ (∆W T ) = ∆W T . Thus, from (45) we have PJ P U ′⊥ (∆W
where the first equality holds from (33) . Therefore, for any optimal solution L ′ + ∆W T , C ′ − ∆ for some ∆ = 0 to (13), ∆W T ∈ PŪ , and ∆ ∈ PĪ. The claim follows.
C. Construction of Q
Here we demonstrate that Q in (39) is well defined. The key is to show (a) there existsĤ ∈ G(C ′ ) such that (35) holds, and (b) the infinite sum in (37) converges. We prove these two properties through the following lemmas.
Lemma 8.
There existsĤ ∈ G(C ′ ) such that (35) holds.
Proof: Since L ′ , C ′ is an optimal solution to the Oracle problem (32) , there exists G ′ , A ′ ∈ C t×p , B ′ , Z ∈ C t×n , and someĤ ∈ G(C) such that
where P T ′⊥ (G ′ ) = 0 and P I (Z) = 0. Then
PŪ PĪ (((ŪV
Combining (46)- (48), we havē
By multiplyingŪ † to both sides of (49), we obtain Lemma 8.
Lemma 9.
ψ := PV P WĪ PV ≤ψ < 1
where (a) follows from Lemma 8, (b) follows from the fact that H has at most k nonzero columns with unit-norm, (c) follows from the property that λ ≤ λ max , k ≤k and σ k ≤ σk, and (d) follows from the definition ofψ. Then Lemma 9 follows.
Lemma 10. PV (I − P WĪ )PV is an injection from PV to PV , and its inverse operation is
Proof: Since PV P WĪ PV < 1 from Lemma 9, then
i ) is well defined. For any X ∈ PV , we have
Then the lemma follows.
D. Proof of Lemma 4
Proof: We need to show that Q defined in (39) satisfies all the conditions in (34) . We first summarize some properties that will be used in the proof. Since W has unit-norm columns, |W † i W j | ≤ µ for all i = j, and |Ī| ≤ k, we have
where the inequality follows from the Geršhgorin circle theorem. From |Ī| ≤ k and
SinceĤ has at most k unit-norm columns while other columns are zero, we have
where the last inequality holds since (L * , C * ) is the solution to (13) and N F ≤ η. Let G be such that G = 1, G, P T * ⊥ (∆W T ) = P T * ⊥ (∆W T ) * and P T * (G) = 0. Let F be such that F i = ∆ i / ∆ i 2 if i ∈Ī and ∆ i = 0, and
where (m) holds because of the optimality of (L * , C * ) and (n) holds because of the convexity of the objective function of (13) . We can see that the last inequality of (61) follows from (b) and (d) of (42). Then we have
Note that
where the last equality follows from (a) of (42). The inequality (o) holds from ŪV † F = trace(VŪ †ŪV † ) = √ r, and
Since θ = min(t, p), combining (62) and (63), we have
From the definition of P WĪ in (38), one can check that
Then we have 
where the last inequality uses the property that 
F. Proof of Lemma 6
Proof: Since equalities (a) and (c) of (42) are the same as those in (34) and the construction of Q remains the same, then (a) and (c) of (42) 
